We find that allowing shareholders to attend the annual general meeting online can greatly increase the participation of shareholders in the meeting. This finding is more evident when the cost of physically attending the meeting is higher. We further document significant positive stock returns when firms first initiate online annual meeting. Finally, we find that retail shareholders indeed actively voice their concerns by voting against the proposals that potentially benefit large shareholders at the costs of retail shareholders. Overall, we provide evidence that online shareholder meeting, a new surging way of holding shareholder meeting, provides shareholders a low-cost effective way to participate in the governance issues.
Introduction
From a governance perspective, annual general meeting (AGM) often serves as an opportunity for management to update shareholders on company developments, for shareholders to ask questions of management and directors, to consider corporate proposals and to review the company's performance. It is generally believed that shareholder participation is a key component of a successful annual meeting and overall governance mechanism. However, the shareholder participation in the annual meeting is extremely low in public firms due to diffused ownership structure and the inconvenience of attending the meeting physically.
In recent years, there has been surging debates regarding the practice of online AGM to enhance shareholder's participation in AGM. One view suggests that online AGM makes the annual meetings more accessible, transparent, efficient and better meet the corporate governance needs of shareholders. Different from the traditional AGM which typically requires shareholders to be physically on the meeting sites, online AGM allows shareholders to attend the meeting through an internet platform. Thus, when the cost of physically attending AGM is high, online AGM may facilitate shareholder participation in AGM.
Critics of online AGM, on the other hand, asserts that it is of limited value because (1) online participation is a poor substitute for "looking the management in the eye," (2) large shareholders will probably attend the physical meeting anyway and retail shareholders may still lack of incentive to even attend the online meeting due to their small stake in the firm, and (3) even if retail investors do actively participate the online meeting, too much intervene of (unsophisticated) retail investors may be value-destroying.
In this paper, we examine whether online AGM can increase shareholder participation in annual meeting based on the data from China. Unlike U.S., Chinese public firms started to adopt online AGM as early as in 2005, and by 2012 about 25% of Chinese public firms use online AGM. 1 The relatively rich history and wide-adoption of online AGM data in China allow us to better examine the effect of online AGM on shareholder participation in the annual meeting, and
shed new insights to the on-going practice of adopting online AGM in the U.S. public firms.
We find that shareholder participation, especially the participation of retail investors, is greatly enhanced after the firm adopts online meeting. This effect is more pronounced when the cost of physically attending AGM is higher, suggesting that the cost of physically attending the meeting is an important factor leading to low participation of shareholders who would otherwise like to attend.
We take a multi-facet approach to account for the potential endogeneity problem. First, we use firm fixed effect to control for the time-invariant firm-specific factors. Second, we use propensity score matching to control for the observable difference between firms with online AGM and firms without. Third, we apply an instrumental variable approach based on the province-level availability of internet as the instrument. Our results are robust to these alternative specifications.
Lastly, we also examine the valuation effects of online AGM. On one hand, online AGM can increase shareholder value because an effective participation of shareholders in AGM facilitates the communication between managers and shareholders and increases the function of 1 In 2009, INTEL becomes the first U.S. company to enable all its shareholders to attend, ask questions, and cast their votes live on the web in its AGM. Since then, more companies follow the suite, although the total number of firms with online AGM is still very small in the U.S. (Lublin (2011) ).
corporate governance. Moreover, considering that the financial cost to the corporation of convening a physical meeting with a large number of shareholders can be nontrivial, online AGM provides a low-cost and geographically unlimited means for many more shareholders to participate in the meeting. On the other hand, shareholders, especially retail shareholders, lack specific information about the firm and their opinions depart from superior choices that managers, with better information, might make on their own (Porter (1992) ). Managers facing frequent shareholder intervene might be less likely to take initiatives (Aghion and Tiroles (1997) and Burkart et al. (1997) ), which in turn decreases shareholder value. Supporting the first view, we find a positive abnormal return at the first announcement of online shareholder meeting. We also find that retail shareholders indeed actively voice their concerns by voting against the proposals that potentially benefit large shareholders at the costs of retail shareholders.
Our paper makes at least four major contributions to the literature. First of all, to best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one to examine the effect of online AGM (a surging new format of holding annual meeting) on shareholder participation in corporate governance practice. Our paper provides evidence that allowing shareholders to attend AGM online indeed increases the shareholder participation and firm value.
Second, starting from the seminal work of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , the incentive for a shareholder to take an active role in corporate governance depends on her ownership and costs of monitoring. The shareholder is more likely to monitor the management if she is a large shareholder and her cost of monitoring is small. Empirical research on shareholder monitoring mainly focuses on the effect of large shareholding on enhancing the shareholders' incentive to monitor (see, for example, Chen et al. (2007) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) ). However, the role of the costs of monitoring is relatively less examined. Our research provides evidence that even retail shareholders can actively participate in the corporate governance issue if their participation cost is reduced.
Third, our paper is also broadly related to the literature on shareholder activism. As noted in Gillian and Starks (2007) , there is no conclusive evidence whether shareholder activism has a significant impact on firm performance. We document that online AGM does stimulate shareholder activism, which has a positive effect on countering back the expropriation of controlling shareholders and increasing firm value.
Finally, our study contributes to understanding the role of information technology in corporate governance. Our results suggest that facilitating shareholders' participation in governance issues through information technology can strengthen the corporate governance of publicly traded firms. All shareholders listed on the AGM registration dates can vote online when companies provide online voting in the AGMs. The registration date is usually one week before the AGM.
Background of online AGM in China
Online shareholders can issue the proposals 10 days before the AGMs if she holds more than 3% firm ownership. Companies may also set up the online Q&A system, and online shareholders can ask questions to management during the AGMs. 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics

Empirical Results
Online AGM and Shareholder Participation
Our main hypothesis is that the availability of online voting can increase the participation of shareholders in the AGMs. To test this hypothesis, we construct the following model: (1)
The dependent variable is the measure of shareholder participation in the AGMs, including the number and ownership of shareholders attending the AGMs. The key independent variable is the Online AGM indicator, which takes the value of one if shareholders can attend the AGMs online, and zero otherwise. We also add a set of control variables, including firm size, performance, risk, growth opportunity, firm age, institution ownership, and executive ownership.
Industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are included to control for industry and time In Column (2), we measure the shareholder participation as the ownership participation in the AGMs. The coefficient on Online AGM is 2.812 and significant at the 1% level, implying the increased participation of shareholders in the AGMs when shareholders can attend the AGMs online.
Given that the effect of online AGM on shareholder participation can be different between large shareholders and retail shareholders, we further divide the aggregate ownership attending the AGMs into ownerships by non-blockholders and blockholders, and employ them as the dependent variable in Column (3) and (4), respectively. We find that the coefficient on Online AGM is 3.803 and significant at the 1% level in Column (3). This coefficient indicates that ownership participation in firms with online AGM by retail investors is 3.8 percentage points higher than that in firms without online AGM. This difference is economically important considering the average retail investor's ownership participation of 1.3 percentage points in firms without online AGM.
In Column (4), the coefficient on online AGM is not significant from zero, indicating that online voting does not increase the participation of blockholders in the AGMs. This finding is unsurprising because blockholders would usually attend the physical AGMs due to the greater interest in the firms. In the remainder of the paper we focus our analysis on the non-blockholder ownership in the AGMs.
The results of control variables show that good firm performance and high growth opportunity enhance the incentive of shareholders attending the AGMs. Further, shareholders prefer to participate in the AGMs held by firms with higher institution ownership and executive ownership.
To mitigate the concern that some time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics drive our results, we run the firm fixed effect regression in Panel B. Controlling for firm fixed effects also allows us to examine the within-firm effects of online AGM on shareholder participation in the AGMs. Column (1) and (2) report that the coefficients on Online AGM are significantly positive whether we employ the number or ownership of shareholders attending the AGMs as the dependent variable. Furthermore, after we divide the aggregate ownership in the AGMs by nonblockholder and blockholder ownerships, the positive effect of online voting on the participation in the AGMs is only found for the non-blockholder ownership regression. Within the same firm, after the firm allows its shareholders to attend AGMs via an online platform, there is a significant increase in shareholder participation (especially the participation of retail shareholders) in the annual meeting.
Overall, the results in Table 3 show that shareholders are more likely to participate in the AGMs when the AGM can be attended online. The boosted enthusiasm of attending the AGMs is particularly pronounced for retail shareholders.
The Effect of Costs of Attending On-site AGMs
We expect that online voting in the AGMs is more beneficial to shareholders when they face higher costs of attending the on-site AGMs. To test this prediction, we construct an indicator variable Transportation center, taking the value of one if the firm's headquarters locates in a transportation center, including Beijing, Tianjin, Harbin, Changchun, Shenyang, Dalian, Shijiazhuang, Qinhuangdao, Tangshan, Qingdao, Jinan, Shanghai, Nanjing, Lianyungang, Xuzhou, Hefei, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhanjiang, Haikou, Taiyuan, Datong, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Nanchang, Chongqing, Chengdu, Kunming, Guiyang, Nanning, Xi'an, Lanzhou, Ürümqi, Hohhot, Yinchuan, Xining, Lasa, and zero otherwise.
2 Considering that it is usually more convenient for shareholders to attend the on-site
AGMs when firms locate in the places of transportation centers, we expect the positive association between online AGM and shareholder participation is weaker for firms located in a place that is easy to reach physically. To examine this implication, we add the variable of Transportation center and its interaction with Online AGM in model (1). Table 4 reports the interaction regression results. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the percentage of shareholders participating in the AGMs. The coefficient on Transportation center is positive and significant, indicating that shareholders have higher interest in attending the AMGs when the convenient transportation reduces the costs of participation. Further, the interaction term Transportation center × Online AGM attracts a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that the effects of online AGMs on the shareholder participation in the AGMs are weaker when firms locate in the places of transportation centers. We find similar results when examining non-blockholder participation in the AGMs in Column (2). In Columns (3) and (4), we examine the within-firm effects by incorporating firm fixed effects in the regression. Because no firms relocate their headquarters in our sample, there is no within-firm variation in Transportation center. Thus, the coefficient on Transportation center itself is not reported. Nevertheless, we still find a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction
Transportation center × Online AGM.
Overall, these results suggest that the positive role of online voting in the AGM participation is more evident when shareholders face higher costs of attending the AGMs on site.
Propensity Score Matching
As a further analysis, we employ a matching technique to examine differences of shareholder participation in the AGMs between firms with and without online voting. The matching procedure controls for selection based on the observable firm characteristics. Our data are well suited to the matching approach given that we have a much large pool of control group (firms without online AGM) compared with the treatment group (firms with online AGM), which increases the likelihood of finding close matches.
We first estimate the propensity scores using a probit model in which the dependent variable is the indicator Online AGM, taking the value of one if the firm has adopted an online AGM and zero otherwise. The independent variables are the full set of firm characteristics as shown in Table 3 . We then use the predicted probabilities (propensity scores) from the probit regression to match each firm-year observation with online AGM to the firm-year observation without online AGM that minimizes the absolute value of the difference between the propensity scores. To find optimal matches, three different matching techniques are employed respectively: nearest neighborhood, Gaussian kernel, and local linear regression. Table 5 Overall these results further support that the availability of online voting greatly increases the enthusiasm of shareholders attending the AGMs, particularly for minority shareholders.
Instrumental Variable Approach
To further address the possible endogeneity in the analysis, we implement the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression in this subsection. In the first step, we estimate the propensity of a firm to adopt online voting in the AGMs. The instrumental variable is Internet availability, defined as the number of internet users divided by total population in a province. Considering that the regional availability of internet influences the local firms' possibility of implementing online voting in the AGMs, the instrument is likely to satisfy the relevance condition. Further, there are no obvious reasons to believe that the province-level availability of internet has a direct effect on the interest of shareholders in an individual firm to attend the AGMs, other than through the effect of online AGM. Thus, the instrument is also likely to satisfy the exogeneity condition. The other control variables used in the first-stage regression include the full set of variables in Table 3 .
As shown in Column (1) of Table 6 , we find that the coefficient on Internet availability is positive and significant at the 1% level. This means that firms in the regions with higher internet availability are more likely to adopt online AGMs. The F statistic on this instrumental variable is 107, suggesting that our IV is unlikely to be subject to the concern of weak instrument (Staiger and Stock (1997) ).
In the second step, we obtain the predicted Online AGM indicator based on the first-step regression and employ it in the regression of shareholder participation in the AGMs. Column (2) reports the second-stage results using the percentage of shareholders attending the AGMs as the dependent variable. The coefficient on Online AGM is 0.194 and significant at the 5% level.
Moreover, in Column (3) the regression of the non-blockholder ownership in the AGMs gets the similar result. These analyses indicate that after controlling for self-selection bias, online voting is still associated with the higher shareholder participation in the AGMs. Overall, Table 7 provides evidence that the stock market reacts positively when a firm initiates online AGM. In other words, the easy access of shareholders to attend AGM via an online platform increases shareholder value.
Additional Investigation on the
Do Shareholder Voice Their Opinions in the Online AGM?
So far, we have shown that online AGM lowers the costs for (retail) shareholders to attend the AGMs and increase their participation. A natural question is: do retail shareholders vote differently from blockholders who will attend the onsite meeting anyway? If retail shareholders always vote in the same way as blockholders, then retail shareholders' participation makes no difference. In this subsection, we examine this question by focusing on the proposal on related party transactions, which is usually referred to as the transactions of asset sales, goods trading, equity sales, cash lending, loan guarantee between listed companies and controlling shareholders.
We focus on related party transactions because it is widely documented that controlling shareholders exploit retail shareholders via these related party transactions (see, for example, Table 8 is based on a subsample of firms that have related party transaction proposals and reveal voting outcomes separately from online and onsite. Appendix 2 lists the details of these proposals. We find a remarkably different voting pattern. From the onsite, 99% of the shareholders support the proposal; but from online, only 65% of the shareholders support the proposal. This is understandable given that related party transactions are likely to benefit controlling shareholders at the expense of retail shareholders. Overall, this table provides evidence that retail shareholders indeed take advantage of the easy access to annual meeting via online platform to voice their concerns and protect their interests.
Conclusions
There is a surging debate about the potential benefits of allowing shareholders to participate AGMs via an internet-based platform. On one hand, advocates of online AGM believe that it is a highly efficient way to enable shareholders to actively participate in shareholder meeting without incurring the expense and inconvenience of travelling to the physical meeting site, and thus enhance shareholder participation in annual meeting. On the other hand, online AGM could make little difference because large shareholders are likely to attend the physical meeting anyway and thus be not affected. Moreover, retail shareholders may still lack of incentive to even attend the online meeting due to their small stake in the firm; even if retail investors do actively participate the online meeting, too much intervene of unsophisticated and inexperienced retail investors may hurt managerial initiatives and thus be value-destroying.
In this paper, we empirically examine whether allowing shareholders to attend annual meeting online can enhance the participation in the meeting. We find that online AGM can greatly increase the participation of shareholders, especially retail shareholders. This result is more pronounced when the costs of attending the physical meeting is larger and is robust to accounting for endogeneity concerns.
Further, we examine the real consequence of allowing online AGM. We document significant positive stock returns when firms first initiate the online AGM. We provide evidence that retail shareholders indeed voice their (different) opinions via online AGM. Overall, our findings indicate that online AGM is a low-cost effective way for shareholders to participate in corporate governance. Our study has important implications for policy-makers who aim to enhance shareholders' participation in the governance issue.
Appendix 1. Variable Definition
Variable Definition
Shareholder attendance The number of shareholders participating in the AGMs divided by the total number of shareholders.
Ownership attendance
The number of shares owned by shareholders participating in the AGMs divided by the total number of shares outstanding.
Non-blockholder ownership attendance
The number of shares owned by non-blockholders participating in the AGMs divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Nonblockholders are the shareholders who own less than 5% firm ownership.
Blockholder ownership attendance
The number of shares owned by blockholders participating in the AGMs divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Blockholders are the shareholders who own more than 5% firm ownership.
Online AGM An indicatory variable, taking the value of one if the firm adopts online annual general meeting, and zero otherwise.
Size
The natural logarithm of total assets.
ROA
The income before extraordinary items divided by total assets.
Stock return
The 12-month cumulative stock return during the fiscal year.
Stock volatility
The standard deviation of monthly stock returns for 36 months before the end of fiscal year.
MB
The market-to-book rate at the end of fiscal year.
Institution ownership
The percentage of shares owned by institution shareholders.
Insider ownership
The percentage of shares owned by executive managers.
Firm age
The number of years since the firm's inception. 
2010
Purchase assets from Xinyuan Highway Co., which is a subsidiary of the controlling shareholder Dongguan Road Bridge Development and Construction Co.
2011
The trade of goods and service with the controlling shareholder Zheda Wangxin Co. and Insigma Technology Co., a subsidiary of Zheda Wangxin Co. Mutually vouch with Insigma Technology Co., which is a subsidiary of the controlling shareholder Zheda Wangxin Co.
2012
The trade of goods and service with the controlling shareholder Zheda Wangxin Co. and Insigma Technology Co., a subsidiary of Zheda Wangxin Co.
Tianjin FAW Xiali Automobile Co., Ltd. 
Purchase material and products from Zhejiang Great Southeast Import & Export Co. which is a subsidiary of the controlling shareholder Zhejiang Great Southeast Group Jiangshu Huachang Chemical Co., Ltd.
2011
The trade of goods and service with Jiangnan Boilers Co., which is a subsidiary of the controlling shareholder Huachang Group Co.
Guangdong Taiantang Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. This table presents the differences of shareholder participation in the AGMs between firms with and without online voting under three different matching criteria: nearest neighborhood, Gaussian kernel and local linear regression. In the first step, we run a probit regression, in which the dependent variable is the online AGM indicator variable and the independent variables are the firm characteristics used in Table 3 . In the second step, we use the predicted probabilities (propensity scores) from the probit regression to match each firm-year observation with online AGM to the firm-year observation without online AGM that minimizes the absolute value of differences between the propensity scores. 
